

# From Coast to Coast: Mapping of Secondary and Tertiary Prevention Initiatives in the Field of Violent Radicalization and Extremism in Canada

## Report 1: Overview of Canadian Organizations



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# Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary.....</b>	<b>IV</b>
Research Objectives .....	V
Procedure.....	V
Key Results .....	V
Recommendations.....	VI
<b>Context &amp; Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Methodology .....</b>	<b>5</b>
Phase 1.....	6
Phase 2.....	8
Phase 3.....	9
<b>The Mapping in Figures.....</b>	<b>12</b>
Sample Description.....	13
Geographical Location of Organizations.....	14
Scope of Organizations and Territories Served .....	15
Types of Polarizations .....	15
Organizational Sectors.....	16
Organizational Objectives .....	17
Specificity of Mandates .....	17
Types of Prevention.....	18
Populations Served .....	18
Services Offered by the Organizations .....	19
Number of Clients Offered Assistance.....	19
Internal Structure of Organizations.....	20
Funding Sources.....	20
<b>Qualitative Results: Practitioner Feedback.....</b>	<b>22</b>
Section Guide .....	23
Overview of Canadian Organizations .....	24
About the Organizations .....	24
Scale of the Organizations.....	26
Organizational Structures.....	28
Missions and Mandates of Organizations .....	30
Organizational Values .....	31
Funding of the Organizations .....	33
Types of Organizational Activities.....	35
Overview of Intervention Programs .....	38
About the Programs .....	38
Program Development Phases.....	40
Program Objectives.....	43
Sectors Involved .....	45
Anticipated Program Outcomes.....	47
Next Steps .....	49
<b>Discussion.....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Key Results and Recommendations .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Limitations.....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Coming up .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>66</b>

# **Executive Summary**

## Research Objectives

The objectives of this mapping are threefold:

1. to identify Canadian initiatives working in the area of secondary and tertiary prevention of radicalization and violent extremism;
2. to document these initiatives in terms of size, structure, content, model, resources, and challenges; and

## Procedure

A qualitative research approach was employed to map secondary and tertiary prevention organizations working in the context of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada.

The mapping was carried out in three main phases:

1. Identification of key players in the field of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada;
2. Documentation of the practices of individuals and organizations working in secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada through semi-structured interviews with practitioners; and

## Key Results

Several key findings emerged from the data analysis:

1. The field of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism is still in its infancy in Canada. Prevention programs are very young and, in many cases, non-specialized. Moreover, professionals receive very little training in the field.
2. Organizations providing secondary and tertiary prevention in the context of violent radicalization are unevenly distributed across the country. Indeed, they are mostly concentrated in large cities in Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta. Furthermore, as many areas of the country lack specialized resources, practitioners from other regions are required to take on additional cases, which subsequently puts more pressure on their own organizations.
3. Canadian practitioners do not feel sufficiently equipped to work with individuals at risk and/or in the process of violent ra-

3. to illustrate the initiatives through an interactive map.

This report is the first of a series of three and provides a comprehensive description of identified Canadian organizations. As such, it answers the questions Who, Does What, and Where in the area of secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada.

3. Analysis of interview data, writing reports, and creating an interactive map of existing resources.

A total of 32 organizations were interviewed by the mapping team between November 2018 and March 2020. Six organizations were excluded from the sample based on the team's inclusion criteria. The interviews were analyzed in-depth to identify relevant information for documenting organizations in terms of size, structure, content, models, resources, and challenges.

dicalization, and they feel anxious when called upon to intervene in this context.

4. Although multi-sectoral and inter-team collaborations are desired and encouraged, they remain difficult to establish. The difficulty is in part due to competition for funding as well as differences in approaches to intervention and information sharing, particularly between the psychosocial and security sectors.

5. Researchers play multiple roles in intervention programs. These roles sometimes extend beyond research. Some researchers, for example, occasionally become involved in client interventions or the design of intervention programs. Such blurring of roles may be due to a lack of practitioners and resources, or confusion about the skills needed to carry out interventions in the field.

## Recommendations

**1.** Continue to support and promote the plurality of values, structures, and sectors, as well as the multidisciplinary nature of teams.

**2.** Ensure consistency between an organization or team's size and capabilities and its needs on the ground.

Given that realities on the ground can differ, strengthening collaborations between organizations and their partners in the field could allow for a better distribution of resources, thereby strengthening the capacity to respond adequately to needs that are as varied as they are multifaceted.

**3.** Renew funding for potentially effective programs to ensure their proper implementation and avoid failures resulting from a lack of resources.

**4.** Encourage exchanges between practitioners from different organizations and teams to maximize knowledge sharing, improve practices, and prevent repeating the same mistakes in different places.

**5.** A) Promote exchanges between practitioners and the communities they work in to develop a better understanding of upstream needs.

B) Support program officers to develop a strategic plan, vision, and medium-term objectives.

**6.** Organizations would benefit from developing explicit theories of change that are articulated and in harmony with the organizations' founding values and missions.

Such theories would help clarify objectives and ensure that these objectives are measurable.

**7.** Organizations should clarify their case management models and explicitly specify their objectives. This would help structure their actions and enable them to evaluate their successes, failures, and needs better.

**8.** Foster trust and collaboration by facilitating sustained contact between organizations/teams through, for example, communities of practice.

**9.** A) Make training accessible and ongoing so that practitioners are aware of developments regarding good practices and research.

B) Promote exchanges between practitioners from different organizations/teams.

**10.** Establish communities of practice or meetings for "simulation exercises" between the police/security and psychosocial/community sectors. Doing so will make it possible to develop consensual solutions for important challenges in the field (e.g., recognizing each sector's culture, understanding national and provincial legal frameworks, and framing the issues of consent, confidentiality, and information sharing).

**11.** Encourage the existence and involvement of community policing in communities of practice and in establishing collaborative links with organizations.

**12.** A) Promote a sustained dialogue with the media community to sensitize them to the delicate balance between disseminating information and their ethical and safety responsibility towards individuals.

B) Engage web and social media giants to face their responsibility in propagating the phenomena of hatred and violent radicalization or extremism and, consequently, their capacity for preventing the phenomena.

C) Hold media and web and social network giants responsible and accountable for their actions should they break pre-established agreements with organizations/teams.

**13.** Diversify funding sources, particularly for newer, smaller, under-funded initiatives that rely primarily on volunteers to operate.

**14.** A) Revise the budget envelopes allocated to research and field initiatives to improve equity and balance of funding.

B) Encourage collaborations between the research and practice communities by putting research into practice.

**15.** Opt for a decentralized approach by developing resources in diverse communities and fostering collaboration between these different resources.

**16.** Assess whether needs exist at the provincial or territorial level and either develop initiatives or optimize existing structures (for example, by giving them a new mandate or providing training) to offer services wherever needed.

**17.** Promote sustained dialogue within communities of practice to share knowledge, tools, and experiences around the issue of risk assessment and management.

The sustained dialogue will also permit the co-development of frameworks and consensus guidelines, especially as the current state of the literature does not allow for the generation of convincing recommendations on the subject.

## In Conclusion

To date, there has been no directory or description of organizations working in the area of violent radicalization and extremism in the country. This mapping is, therefore, the first of its kind in Canada.

This report is devoted to describing these organizations. It will be followed by a second report that will focus on issues of collaboration and a third report that will examine intervention models and issues related to interventions.



# **Introduction & Context**

## Transition of Public Policies about Violent Radicalization and Extremism in Canada

The response to terrorism and violent extremism has traditionally involved various forms of security interventions ranging from gathering intelligence, security forces' operations, and military action at the international level. As a result, these sectors have been and continue to be heavily funded and resourced so as to enable them to deal with these phenomena—hitherto broadly viewed as external threats. It was only after the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 that the notion of violent radicalization came to be identified as a process capable of giving rise to domestic terrorism.

At the same time, the complexity of the trajectories of people in the process of violent radicalization and the risks this phenomenon poses to the safety of individuals, communities, and national security have led institutions from sectors other than national security (i.e., mental health, community, education, and social services) to be involved in prevention activities. For the first time, the “revolutionary” idea emerged that violent radicalization and extremism could be prevented by means other than the security approach. This has drastically changed how persons on a trajectory toward extremism were portrayed (Madriaza et al., 2017), in that they were no longer perceived mainly as threats to themselves and others but were also now recognized as vulnerable individuals in need of support and services. As a consequence, multitiered prevention models became more and more integrated into prevention efforts. Also, the notion of early prevention—rather than intervention or post-vention—gained attention due to the importance it places on work beginning upstream and aiming to reduce or eliminate the conditions of risk that can make individuals more vulnerable to violent radicalization or push them toward recidivism.

For Canada, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States signified the starting point for the development of public policy on counter-terrorism in the country. Many researchers agree that the creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in

Canada in 2003 was the result of the alignment of the two countries' counter-terrorism policies (Carvin & Tishler, 2020; Leman Langlois & Brodeur, 2005). Several years later, in 2011, the Government of Canada announced the launch of Project Kanishka, named in honour of the victims of the deadliest attack in Canadian history, namely the June 23, 1985 attack on Air India Flight 182, in which 329 people lost their lives. In 2012, Canada launched its first counter-terrorism strategy—entitled *Building Resilience to Terrorism* (Government of Canada, 2012)—based on four pillars: Prevent, Detect, Deprive, and Intervene. Thereafter, Canada began to focus on upstream prevention.

To be successful, Canada's counter-terrorism activities cannot be limited to operations directed against groups or individuals who have already engaged in terrorist activities. They must also be supported by preventive measures, aimed at preventing vulnerable individuals from being drawn into terrorism (Government of Canada, 2012, p. 5).

Nevertheless, many researchers consider that the strategy has focused more on the security aspects of the fight against terrorism than on prevention as such and that the prevention sector remains a poorly funded and ill-defined entity, thus hindering the implementation of concrete actions (Carvin & Tishler, 2020; Wood, 2019).

At the provincial level, in 2015, Quebec was the only province to have developed and adopted a governmental action plan, “*Radicalization in Quebec: Acting, Preventing, Detecting and Living Together*.” The plan aimed to deliver a concerted, coherent, and prompt response to the violent radicalization phenomenon based on interdepartmental work (Quebec, Ministère de l'immigration, 2015). In addition, the action plan was supposed to offer support and mobilize action in the health, education, and community sectors. The Quebec government's plan ran from 2015 to 2020 but has not been renewed since.

At the federal level, the creation of the Canadian Centre for Community Engagement and

Violence Prevention (CCCEVP) in 2017—the year with the highest number of extremist incidents in Canada since the 1960s—marks the shift towards multisectoral prevention in terms of public policy at the federal level. This psychosocial and preventive turning point was complemented by the launch of the National Strategy to Combat Radicalization Leading to Violence in 2018 (Government of Canada, 2018). Unlike previously, the launch of the strategy was preceded by public consultations in different cities across the country. This meant that the strategy was based on Canadian needs rather than being a result of Canadian alignment with international or allied strategies. In this strategy, the Government of Canada differentiates between radicalization and radicalization leading to violence by focusing on evidence-based early prevention and on manifestations of intolerance and hatred that can escalate into violent incidents. Since 2017, CCCEVP is—through the Community Resiliency Fund—the primary and sometimes sole source of funding for violent radicalization prevention programs in Canada, as well as for a significant amount of research in the field.

To date, there is, however, no information on the location, size, structure, and components of the various programs operating in Canada. There is also no information on the issues that practitioners face on a daily basis working with those affected by violent radicalization, nor is there information on issues related to multidisciplinary or intersectoral collaboration. This lack of knowledge constitutes a significant shortcoming in Canadian public policy, as it could impede the identification of areas of need and the appropriate allocation of public resources so that they are directed where they are most needed. Furthermore, the lack of knowledge poses major challenges for Canadian practitioners working in the field since they work in silos and do not have the specialized support that facilitates collaborations and improved prevention and intervention practices.

**The mapping is intended to be a decision-making tool for public policy, as well as a reference tool for practitioners, researchers, and developers of prevention programs in the field.**

Consequently, one of the first tasks of the Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV) was to map secondary and tertiary prevention programs for violent extremism in Canada. The mapping is intended to be a decision-making tool for public policy, as well as a reference tool for practitioners, researchers, and developers of prevention programs in the field. The identification of such programs, in turn, can facilitate the development of a more effective referral system based on providing everyone with information on initiatives in various fields. Moreover, the mapping can help determine both geographic and structural strengths and needs of these initiatives and identify the challenges of multidisciplinary

and multisectoral coordination, allowing for improved collaboration and exchanges of practices. This will contribute to strengthening capacity across the country and allocating resources where they are most needed.

This document is the first of three reports on the results of the mapping. It contains information

regarding the size, extent, structure, and nature of existing initiatives in Canadian cities, provinces, and territories. It also highlights the needs expressed by the practitioners. The two forthcoming reports will provide a detailed analysis of the issues related to multidisciplinary and multisectoral collaborations, and the daily challenges faced by Canadian practitioners in the field of intervention.

**The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV)**

The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV—<https://cpnprev.ca/>) was established in 2017 to help build the capacity of Canadian practitioners working in this field. The objective of CPN-PREV is to promote best practices in terms of assessment, prevention, and intervention in the field of violent radicalization and extremism, as well as to develop a coordinated network of practitioners from various sectors to promote a more holistic multisectoral approach to the prevention of violent extremism. CPN-PREV supports best practices and collaborations between intervention teams through research, education, and ongoing knowledge mobilization among researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and various community sectors.



# Methodology

A qualitative research approach was used in order to map secondary and tertiary prevention organizations in the context of radicalization and violent extremism in Canada. The mapping was carried out in three main phases detailed in this section. These phases and their sub-phases are based on the 4W mapping strategy commonly used by organizations such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) to map and coordinate responses to humanitarian crises resulting from disasters such as armed conflict and war. Although violent radicalization in Canada has not yet reached an equivalent level of urgency, 4W mapping has many advantages because it can be used to map any form of activity, response, or service over large geographic areas.

The table below summarizes the different stages of the mapping project.

**Table 1. Project Phases**

<b>Phase 1</b>	<p>Identifying the key players in the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Evaluate and ethically approve the project</li> <li>B. Identify practitioners and organizations working in the field of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada</li> <li>C. Select individuals and organizations meeting the criteria for inclusion in the mapping process</li> </ul>
<b>Phase 2</b>	<p>Documenting the practices of individuals and organizations working to prevent violent radicalization and extremism in Canada</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Collect data: The mapping interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Phase 3</b>	<p>Analyzing the data from the mapping interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>B. Prepare the data for analysis</li> <li>C. Process and analyze the data</li> </ul>

## **Phase 1: Identifying the Key Players in the Prevention of VIOLENT RADICALIZATION and EXTREMISM in Canada**

### **A. Evaluate and Ethically Approve the Project**

First, the research project was submitted to the Institutional Committee for Research Ethics with Humans (ICREH) of the University of Quebec in Montreal. The ICREH reviewed the research protocol and gave its approval. The research was conducted in full compliance with

the research ethics criteria of the Tri-Council Policy Statement and involved minimal risk to participants.

## B. Identify Practitioners and Organizations Working in the Field of Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Extremism in Canada

To account for the fact that there is currently no directory listing individuals and organizations working in the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada, the structured snowball method was used to develop such a directory.

First, the mapping team conducted a search of its direct network to draw up a preliminary list of key actors working in the field. Key provincial and federal government departments were subsequently contacted to obtain a list of organizations they were able to provide. Third, practitioners and organizations known to the Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV) were added to the list of key players. All of the 505 individuals and organizations identified were then asked to name colleagues, colla-

borators, and partners also working in the field. Simultaneously, internet searches for relevant organizations and practitioners were conducted, and email messages asking for credentials of those identified were sent. In addition, references were also obtained from events that brought together national and international experts on the issue. Contact information (i.e., name of individual or organization, contact information, city, province, field of expertise and specialization) was entered into an internal CPN-PREV registry. This preliminary data provided a comprehensive overview of individuals and organizations relevant working across the country.

## C. Select Individuals and Organizations Meeting the Criteria for Inclusion in the Mapping Process

All individuals and organizations doing work related to the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism across Canada that had been identified in the previous stage and met the criteria for inclusion in the mapping process were contacted and invited to participate.

### Search Inclusion Criteria


In order to be considered eligible to participate in the mapping, individuals or organizations had to meet the following two criteria:

1. Be an individual or an organization from any sector of society (e.g., health, education, community, social services, psychology, correctional services, justice, youth protection, police, etc.) working in Canada in the field of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism; and

2. Carry out secondary and/or tertiary prevention activities in a context of violent radicalization.

### Search Exclusion Criteria

Individuals or organizations engaged solely in primary prevention, research, or training.



**Figure 1. The three types of prevention according to CPN-PREV mapping criteria.**

## **Phase 2: Documenting the Practices of Individuals and Organizations Working to Prevent Violent Radicalization and Extremism in Canada**

### **A. Collect Data: The Mapping Interviews**

#### Invitation to Interviews

Eligible individuals and organizations were contacted via email and invited to participate in an interview to document their practices. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted one and a half hours on average. When possible, the interviews were carried out face-to-face; otherwise, video conferences were used.

#### Data Collection Tool

In preparation, the research team built the framework of the interviews based on the 4W format (IASC, 2012), a practical method in situations where there is no directory listing and documenting existing resources in a field relevant to the fieldwork. Due to the fact that at present, there is no directory documenting resources specializing in secondary and tertiary prevention in the context of violent radicalization in Canada, 4W became the method of choice for mapping.

Since the 4W method is specifically designed to answer questions such as “who” is “where”, “when”, and “doing what”, these basic questions formed the skeleton of the interview framework. However, to better meet the mapping’s objectives, modifications were made to some of the questions, notably with the addition of the “how” and “with whom” questions and the removal of the “when” question. This resulted in the mapping interview framework consisting of five lines of inquiry designed to answer the questions below.



**Figure 2. The five axes of CPN-PREV mapping.**

As shown in the diagram above, the “who,” “what,” “doing what,” and “where” questions are part of the original question set of the 4W model. Since the mapping research was also aimed at further documenting organizations in terms of prevention models, resources, and collaborations, the “how” and “with whom” questions were added to the interview framework. Following the development of this model, sub-questions were developed for each of the five research axes. These were subsequently used to guide the interviews.

#### **Training Research The assistants and Administering the Interviews**

Dassistants were given a two-day training on the use of the interview framework and the skills needed to conduct semi-structured interviews. The training session was supervised by experienced researchers, and the first interviews were conducted in the presence of the mapping coordinator.

### **Phase 3: Analyzing the Data From the Mapping Interviews**

The interviews were subject to an in-depth analysis with the aim of identifying information pertinent to documenting Canadian organizations working in the field in terms of size, structure, content, models, resources, and challenges. The present section provides details on the data analysis methodology utilized for all the collected data. While the data collection tool is primarily used to describe Canadian organi-

#### **Number of Interviews**

A total of 32 interviews were carried out by the mapping team between November 2018 and March 2020. Six of those revealed that the work of the individuals and organizations interviewed was mainly focused on primary prevention, research, and/or training—something which did not meet our inclusion criteria. As a result, the six respondents were excluded from the sample. This situation highlights the gap between our definition of what is considered secondary or tertiary prevention work with individuals at risk and in the process of radicalization and the way in which certain organizations and individuals qualify their work. Seeing as this concerns a significant proportion of the sample (six out of 32 participants), it would be relevant to examine this difference in perception in a later report.

zations, only the themes related to the “who,” “what,” “doing what,” and “where” elements of the data collection tool are included in the analysis and results (see Figure 2). Two subsequent reports will provide an in-depth analysis of the components related to collaborations (“with whom”) and prevention models (“how”), respectively.

## A. Prepare the Data for Analysis

A team of research assistants carefully transcribed the audio files of the interviews. The transcribers were instructed to prepare a full transcript including silences, laughter, sighs, and any other indicators of emotion. The transcribed interviews were corrected and then anonymized. An alphanumeric code was randomly assigned

to each research participant. Any identifying information found in the transcripts was also replaced by a code associated with the participant, according to a preset legend. This information is stored in a master file protected by a code and held in a locked location.

## Process and Analyze the Data

### Summary

NVivo 12 software was used to process and qualitatively analyze the data. Excerpts from the interviews were categorized by the research assistants according to five research axes, namely, "who," "what," "where," "how," and "with whom." The excerpts were then analyzed

in depth to highlight the issues and other main themes reported by practitioners during the interviews. The emerging themes identified within each of the five axes were subsequently presented as diagrams (see Qualitative Results section).

### Detailed Methodology

An adapted version of the anchored theory was used in the research process. The anchored theory is an analytical model which allows the development of emerging theories based on empirical data (Charmaz, 2014a). Since the present study's goal is to describe existing programs in Canada and—at a later stage—iden-

tify existing prevention models in the country, as well as analyze issues concerning collaboration, the anchored theory proved to be the most appropriate method to facilitate modeling through a process of conceptual reconstruction. The figure below summarizes the data processing and analysis process.




Figure 3. Coding process and thematic analysis.

As illustrated, the conceptual reconstruction is made up of several stages (Saldaña, 2013).

### First Coding Cycle

The first coding cycle is usually used to “identify, note, name, summarize, synthesize, thematize, almost line by line by line, the objective developed within the corpus on which the analysis is based” (Paille, 1994, p. 154). However, in order to facilitate the analysis, the present part was divided into two sub-phases.

1) **Dimensional or Structural Analysis.** In order to ensure that the coding meets the specific needs of mapping research, it was decided that the main and secondary themes would be determined in advance from a thematic tree of the five dimensions—“who,” “what,” “where,” “how,” and “with whom”—addressed by this study. This allowed for easy retrieval of information.

The categories were recorded in a codebook as well as on NVivo 12. The codebook contains clear instructions on how to define the categories (i.e., nodes) of the thematic tree and the type of information that can be coded into them. This served as backup material for the research assistants in charge of coding the interviews, allowing them to refer to it when needed.

Since coding represents a stage of the research that is dependent on the subjectivity of the coders, two days of training were offered to the research assistants in order to familiarize them with the thematic tree. During the training, an interview was coded in teams. Furthermore, node definitions were discussed in groups and adjustments made as required. The training sessions resulted in a more uniform and consensual understanding of the node definitions and the coding process.

To verify the level of consensus between the coders, the interrater agreement was reached one month after the start of coding. This allowed us to ascertain whether the coding was consistent and clarify areas of disagreement. To do this, research assistants were asked to individually code the same interview. A Cohen

Kappa average was then calculated on NVivo 12, with results indicating an average Kappa of 0.52, which represents a moderate agreement. The coding continued after a session of debriefing with the research assistants.

Finally, the research assistants were assigned the interviews requiring coding and asked to write memos to document the coding process and to begin the content analysis of the interviews.


2) **Descriptive Coding.** Once the dimensional coding was completed, the extracts associated with each of the axes (i.e., “who,” “what,” “where,” “how,” and “with whom”) were distributed among the research assistants so that they could carry out a descriptive and emergent coding within each of the dimensions. Descriptive coding consists of summarizing the content of a passage of information in a word or a short sentence (Saldaña, 2013). The extracts within each node of the thematic tree were then analyzed by research assistants to highlight emerging themes.

### Second Coding Cycle

During this stage, the chunks of information that had already been coded into broader categories (i.e., interconnected categories) were organized and grouped together (Charmaz, 2014b). In essence, this stage consists of creating categories that bring the themes together in a much more comprehensive way so that they describe the phenomena and events arising from the data (Paillé, 1994, p. 159). In a way, this involves a reorganization of the emerging themes.

### Integration

During the integration of the information, the conceptual categories were analyzed in relation to both the objectives and the conceptual framework of the research. The conceptual categories identified through the thematic analysis constitute the qualitative findings of this report. The categories were subsequently presented in diagram form.

The background consists of large, overlapping geometric shapes in a teal color against a white background. A diagonal line runs from the top-left towards the bottom-right, creating a white triangular area on the left and a teal area on the right. The teal area is further divided into overlapping shapes, creating a layered effect.

# **The Mapping in Figures**

## SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

This section provides an overview of the Canadian organizations in secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization identified during the mapping process. By compiling the characteristics of these organizations, it was possible to get a quantitative overview of the various resources available in Canada and to document these organizations in terms of

geographic location, sector of activity, structure, scope, objectives and nature of work, audience served, and funding. The data allow us to highlight the challenges facing the field of secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization and to identify service availability gaps across the country.



**Figure 4. Sample description**

A total of 32 organizations were interviewed as part of the research. Twenty-six of them met the inclusion criteria, which were as follows:

- Be an individual or organization working in Canada in all sectors of society in the field of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism; and
- Be involved in secondary or tertiary prevention of violent radicalization.

Of the 26 eligible interviews, 23 had been coded as part of the data analysis, while the remaining three were added later and were, therefore, not coded. Some information concerning the three organizations whose interviews were not coded was, nevertheless, included as part of the statistics presented, which explains the variation in the sample size (n).

## GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF ORGANIZATIONS




Figure 5. Geographic location of organizations.


**Table 2. Number of Organizations by Province and Territory**

Provinces and Territories	Number of organizations
Quebec	9
Ontario	8
Alberta	5
British Columbia	3
New Brunswick	1
Newfoundland and Labrador	0
Prince Edward Island	0
Nova Scotia	0
Saskatchewan	0
Manitoba	0
Yukon	0
Northwest Territories	0
Nunavut	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>

The data reveal a high concentration of resources in three Canadian provinces, namely Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta. These provinces alone account for almost 85% of organizations in Canada, with Quebec being the province with the most resources. There were no orga-

nizations providing secondary and/or tertiary prevention of violent radicalization services in the territories or the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador.

## SCOPE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND TERRITORIES SERVED




**Figure 6. Scope of organizations and territories served. (n=26)**

Note. Organizations have been categorized according to the highest level at which they offer services. Thus, organizations that operate internationally can also do so at the national, provincial, regional, and municipal levels, while organizations that provide services at the national level can do so at the provincial, regional, and municipal levels.

The scope of the organizations was determined by the range of their services and the territories they serve according to their respective mandates. The majority of organizations (15/26) are municipal or regional in scope. Almost one-quarter of the organizations are provincial.

Fewer Canadian organizations operate at the national and international levels, indicating that initiatives are primarily focused on serving smaller populations or communities, allowing them to tailor their interventions to the local context.

## Types of Polarizations




**Figure 7. Types of polarization. (n=26)**

The overwhelming majority of Canadian organizations (23/26) do not specifically target a single type of radicalization. Instead, they accept individuals on a trajectory related to all types of social polarization. In terms of re-

ligious radicalization, the two programs targeting it are essentially set up and administered by religious institutions. Only one organization addresses exclusively polarizations linked to the extreme right.

## ORGANIZATIONAL SECTORS



**Figure 8. Organizational sectors.**

The data highlight the fact that the majority of the organizations interviewed for this research were from the psychosocial sector (14/26), with an almost equal number from the community and law enforcement sectors (12/26). It should be noted that only the police agencies with specialized units or trained police officers res-

possible for intervening with populations that are at risk or in the process of violent radicalization were included. Moreover, CPN-PREV received a greater number of references from the psychosocial sector, leading to it being over-represented in the sample.

## ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES




Figure 9. Organizational objectives.

(n=26)

A common goal for all the interviewed organizations was to intervene in the context of violent radicalization and extremism. A very large proportion of the organizations was also invol-

ved in research (18) and training (16), while primary prevention formed a more marginal part of the organizations' objectives.

## SPECIFICITY OF MANDATES




Figure 10. Mandate specificity.

The results indicate that only 54.2% of the sample—that is, just over half of the organizations—have a specific mandate to prevent violent radicalization and extremism. This shows that in a significant number of cases (45.8%),

organizations had broader mandates (such as violence prevention) and developed programs specific to intervention in the context of violent radicalization and extremism at a later stage.

## TYPES OF PREVENTION




Figure 11. Types of prevention.

All 24 of the interviewed organizations believe that they are involved in secondary prevention and work with individuals at risk. Of these, 19 organizations are also engaged in tertiary prevention and work with individuals in the pro-

cess of violent radicalization. Finally, while only nine organizations also had primary prevention as their objective (see Figure 9), 14 reported conducting it.

## POPULATIONS SERVED




Figure 12. Populations served

All of the interviewed organizations work with adults and/or adolescents, while 18 organizations said that their interventions are aimed at the families and/or the entourage of their clients. Only ten organizations also offer services to children. Consequently, the organizations' clientele seems to be mainly made up of adolescents

and adults, regardless of whether they are considered to be at risk or in the process of violent radicalization, or whether they are part of the entourage of an individual who is at risk or in the process of violent radicalization.

## SERVICES OFFERED BY THE ORGANIZATIONS




**Figure 13. Services offered by organizations.**

As illustrated above, organizations in Canada offer a wide variety of services to their clients. The majority (i.e., 14 organizations in the psychosocial sector) report providing psychosocial services, and most (16) have peer support or mentoring assistance. This suggests that coaching and support services are widespread. Moreover, several organizations offer religious

support services (7), as well as assistance in the area of education (7), employment (6) and housing (6). Police services are offered exclusively by organizations in the law enforcement sector (6). In addition, a few organizations provide legal assistance (3), arts activities (2), medical services (2) or have counselling sessions available to their clients (2).

## NUMBER OF CLIENTS OFFERED ASSISTANCE



**Figure 14. Number of clients offered assistance.**

Note. The number of clients offered assistance shown reflects the situation at the time of the interviews.

At the time of the interviews, most organizations (10) were not able to quantify the number of clients who had benefited from their services since their implementation. Seven organiza-

tions estimated that they had assisted more than ten clients, four reported fewer than ten cases, and two have had no clients.

## INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS




Figure 15. Internal structure of organizations

(n=23)

The vast majority of organizations have a single team that shares tasks related to their program objectives. Eight organizations are either made up of multiple teams, each with a specific function (e.g., intervention, management, training, and research, etc.), or multiple departments with one responsible for the prevention of radicalization program. Lastly, two organizations have

a single unit consisting of just one member. In some cases, it may be an individual—within a larger organization not explicitly dedicated to violent radicalization—who is made responsible for the violent radicalization prevention issue or an individual who alone constitutes an organization and offers services independently.

## FUNDING SOURCES





Figure 16. Funding sources.



**Figure 17. Sources of funding (continued).**

**(n=23)**

The data reveals that the vast majority of organizations are dependent on government funding for their operations, making governments the primary fund providers for Canadian programs. Indeed, 60.9% of organizations are funded by a government entity, mainly at the federal level, with some organizations receiving funding from provincial and municipal governments. However, of the interviewed organizations, more than a quarter (6/23) revealed

not receiving any funding and, therefore, having to find other means of covering the expenses associated with their activities. These organizations were, in essence, dependent on exchanges of services through collaborations with partners, from self-funding and volunteer work. Failing to secure funding from the government, eight organizations report receiving support from partner organizations and three from charitable organizations or individuals.

*Qualitative Results*

# **Practitioner Feedback**

## Section Guide

This section of the report describes the themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis of the mapping interviews. Having presented quantitative data on Canadian organizations, it is worth looking more closely at what the research participants had to say about their organizations and the intervention programs available to them. The figure below provides an

overview of all the themes that emerged during the analysis and forms a structure according to which the qualitative results will be presented in this report. In addition, the main points of each of the themes will be presented in the form of diagrams, followed by an explanatory text describing the observations that were made in relation to each of the themes.



Figure 18. Section guide.

# OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN ORGANIZATIONS

## ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONS

It is important to start by giving an overview of what the practitioners interviewed during the mapping process had to say about their organizations.




Figure 19. About the organizations.

## OBSERVATIONS

The results indicate that the 32 interviewed organizations working in the field of secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization in Canada generally fall into six different types, namely:

1. Situation tables or hubs;
2. Religious organizations offering prevention and intervention services;
3. Law enforcement and security-related organizations;
4. Government entities providing services to individuals;
5. Community-based organizations; and
6. Organizations offering psychosocial services.

The structure of internal teams differs but generally includes one or more of the following components: a group dedicated to the intervention; employees carrying out training sessions; a group of researchers; a group specializing in

prevention activities; and a dedicated management team. Due to a lack of human resources, the staff of these organizations are often involved in more than one aspect of a given intervention program. In fact, some organizations only have one team or even just one employee in charge of various aspects of a project.

In terms of the scale of the organizations, this varied greatly from municipal to international. Also, the number of employees, key partners or volunteers involved varied between one and 200 people. It should be noted, however, that the number of employees is not necessarily a reflection of the size and scope of the programs. For instance, a program with an international reach and multiple activities can operate with a very small number of employees, while a local initiative with few activities may require more staff. Finally, participants reported that their organizations had established links with partners from a variety of sectors, including psychosocial, community, educational, and law enforcement.

## SCALE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS

This section takes a closer look at the scale of Canadian organizations working in the field of secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization. As already mentioned, these or-

ganizations differ in terms of type and scale, which, in this report, was determined according to the geographic reach within which services can be accessed, as well as impact.



Figure 20. Scale of the organizations.

## OBSERVATIONS

The results indicate that the organizations differ in scope, making the task of defining them exceptionally difficult. Indeed, due to a lack of resources and the fact that services and expertise necessary to intervene in a context of radicalization are not equally available across the country, regional organizations may frequently be called upon to intervene at the national level—often on an emergency basis—when a case presents a higher level of risk and requires immediate attention. This fluidity in terms of scope of the organizations concerns several levels (i.e., municipal, regional, provincial, national, and international) and has made any form of classification problematic. It was therefore decided to determine the scope of the organizations based on their initial mandate. The majority of organizations are either municipal (7) or regional (8) and are, therefore, mandated to intervene at the level of their own city and sometimes at that of neighbouring towns. Other organizations have activities covering their entire province (6), but only a few are able to operate at a national level (2), which could explain why some municipal, regional, and provincial organizations are being asked to expand the scale of their initiatives in order to intervene elsewhere in the country. However, this expansion is not always accompanied by an increase in funding and human resources. As a result, it is often the case that the organizations themselves have to bear the costs and consequences of interventions, be it in terms of salaries, travel expenses, or work overload due to a lack of personnel.

Furthermore, the data collected reveal the absence of organizations working in the provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland

and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia as well as in the territories. It remains to be determined whether resources exist in these locations but are not manifest enough to be detected by the mapping. If, however, such services simply do not exist, the question then arises as to whether this is because the phenomenon of violent radicalization is not present or is only marginally present in these places. However, the data on the spread of extreme right-wing groups across the country raises serious doubts about the latter possibility.

The results also indicate that at the time of research, there were very few services available in the Maritime Provinces. The Maritimes are primarily served by national organizations; regional organizations of neighbouring provinces or cases of violent radicalization are automatically taken charge of by the police and the justice system. Discussions with government employees and stakeholders from some provinces and territories (Yukon, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick) revealed that there are resources in these locations offering intervention services in the broader context of violence (i.e., theft, sexual aggression, domestic violence, assault, etc.), but that, to their knowledge, there were no resources offering services specific to violent radicalization. It is also important to note that services are mainly available in large cities and that provincial organizations are almost exclusively located within the four Canadian provinces of Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta. Finally, some organizations operate internationally and may be called upon to intervene or to offer their expertise outside the country.

## ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

Depending on their resources, mandates, and financial means, organizations distribute their staff in a variety of ways. The following section

describes the types of internal structures found in Canadian organizations.




Figure 21. Organizational structures.

## OBSERVATIONS

### Internal Structures

Given that Canadian organizations come in six different forms (see “About organizations”), their internal structure also differs. The analyses of the mapping interviews have identified three types of structures characterizing the different organizations:

1. Organizations with multiple teams, each with a specific role (i.e., intervention, training, management, etc.);
2. Organizations with one team where tasks are divided according to the skills and availability of each team member; and
3. Organizations consisting of a single member or large organizations that have a mandate not specific to violent radicalization and that have assigned a single individual to intervention activities within a context of violent radicalization. This person then becomes the organization’s resource for all related concerns.

### Role Divisions

The results also highlight the main roles of teams and employees. Most organizations have teams or staff assigned to the management and administration of activities, client intervention, research, training, and primary prevention. Organizations that do not have enough staff or resources to form several teams are forced to prioritize their activities based on their objectives and the time available to achieve them. Nevertheless, the management and interven-

tion teams form the core of the organizations we met with. The staff body is diverse and includes, among others, mental health personnel, social workers, police officers, management staff, researchers, religious personnel, and former extremists. Some organizations, particularly the hubs and situational tables, work with a greater variety of professionals, depending on the specific needs of their clientele. The multisectoral nature of these organizations gives them access to a broader range of resources.

### Services Provided

The number of cases an organization can take on depends on its size, how well established it is, and the nature and the number of requests it receives. At the time of the interviews, at least two organizations—still in an early stage of development—reported not having had any clients. Other organizations felt they had a heavy workload but lacked resources, expertise, or even the right structure to deal with a large and complex client base. In contrast, some organizations said they were not receiving many cases and even went as far as to question the relevance of their initiatives because they mobilized resources that could be more useful in other regions or for other types of problems. However, the majority of organizations had not counted the number of cases they had taken on at the time of the interviews. This could be explained by the fact that these organizations were new and had not yet begun their intervention activities or because their internal statistics had yet to be compiled.

## MISSIONS AND MANDATES OF ORGANIZATIONS

Most organizations have their own unique missions. This section summarizes the main missions mentioned during the mapping interviews.



Figure 22. Missions and mandates of organizations.

### OBSERVATIONS

The thematic analysis of the interviews helped highlight the missions of the organizations. These seem to be humanitarian in nature and mainly aimed at intervening with people at risk of violent radicalization and/or in the process of violent radicalization, as well as with communities. More specifically, the organizations seek to:

- Provide a safe space for clients and the people around them;
- Promote compassion and forgiveness;
- Change their clients' attitudes towards the world;
- Work with communities in a collaborative and inclusive way;

- Carry out mental health interventions;
- Provide support to families and friends of people affected by violent radicalization; and
- Serve and protect—particularly in case of organizations in the law enforcement sector

Community-based organizations and those offering psychosocial services stress the importance of creating a safe space for their clients and the people around them because it allows them to express their emotions and opinions without the fear of judgment and receive the support they need.

## ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES

Organizations not only have missions that guide their activities and objectives but also values that are important to them and are reflected

in their intervention programs and in the way they interact with their clients.




Figure 23. Organizational values.

## OBSERVATIONS

### Values

It is worth noting that each organization we met had a set of values that defined its identity and greatly influenced its actions and approach to interventions. The values were based on the founding principles of the conceptual framework of the program and, despite occasional differences, we were able to identify the core values and principles guiding the majority of organizations. These included non-violence, coexistence, inclusivity, and—depending on the sector to which the organization belonged—confidentiality, non-judgment, forgiveness, and transparency. It should also be noted that the involvement and commitment of an organization's staff and volunteers were values emerging from the majority of the interviews, regardless of sector.

In contrast, organizations in the law enforcement, psychosocial, and community sectors were at odds with each other in how they perceived security, consent, non-judgment, and confidentiality. Indeed, law enforcement agencies are sometimes required to break confidentiality because of their obligation to report acts they consider to be criminal. Moreover, in the name of public and national security, they may sometimes exercise a certain level of judgment towards their clients. While programs in other sectors may be implemented with the clients' consent, police interventions cannot always guarantee that, neither can they be made on a voluntary basis. Problems related to the differences in values between the law enforcement and other sectors, however, seem to be less prominent when it comes to police officers whose mandate is to build links with local communities.

### Principles

Several interviews emphasized the value of the promotion of evidence-based practices. Practitioners felt it was important for their prevention programs to be based on scientific literature and for interventions to remain flexible. In addition, many stressed that interventions needed to be tailored to the specific needs of each client as opposed to the traditional, one-fits-all intervention style. Fostering diversity of opinions is another principle emerging from the interviews. The interviewed organizations advocated embracing the diversity of opinions instead of the “deradicalization” approach aimed at changing the divergent ideas and opinions of their client base. Listening, acceptance, taking responsibility, and reintegration are also important principles to those interviewed. Valuing lived experiences was particularly relevant to organizations that employ or have been founded by former extremist group members who use their own experience to help others on the journey out of extremist groups and violence.

## FUNDING OF THE ORGANIZATIONS

The interviewed organizations highlighted challenges such as funding sources, allocation, and distribution, as well as insufficient resources.




Figure 24. Funding of the organizations.

## OBSERVATIONS

Funding for the interviewed organizations comes from a relatively undiversified pool of sources. Indeed, the majority are funded by the state (60%), mainly by the federal government, although provincial and/or municipal funding is also available. Ministries related to public safety and health are over-represented among donors. Some organizations reported receiving donations from individuals or foundations, while others were funded by charities, higher education institutions, or the private sector. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of the organizations felt that they lacked the funding necessary to cover all their activities and achieve their objectives. Six organizations indicated that they did not receive any external funding and instead had to rely on the generosity of volunteers and on self-funding, while several others said they used service exchanges with their collaborators to overcome funding shortages and support their projects.

The interviews also helped to shed light on several funding-related issues. First, the fact that funding comes from both limited and undiversified sources creates competition among Canadian organizations in the context of secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization. Observed at both the national and local levels, this competition has contributed to a sense of rivalry and tension between organizations. Another issue that emerged from the

interviews was a perceived inequity in the allocation of funding whereby the same organizations seem to receive grants or have funding renewed, leaving little opportunity for smaller or newer initiatives to gain support that would enable them to reach their full potential. Moreover, some organizations felt that research was favoured over practice, deploring the fact that a substantial proportion of funding was allocated to violent radicalization research rather than to work on the ground. Also, several practitioners considered the length of time for which funding is guaranteed—usually 4–5 years—to be insufficient to achieve the objectives of a program. Finally, funding delays and administrative deadlines were identified as significant issues. Inability to receive funding when expected or having to spend funds before the end of the fiscal year may be a source of financial stress. In terms of the distribution of funding within organizations, practitioners suggested that a large proportion of money would go towards staff salaries and client intervention activities. Unfortunately, few details on the matter were provided during the interviews. Additionally, the interviewed organizations seemed unable to say what proportion of funding went to each component or activity of their initiatives. Depending on the priorities at a given time, however, funding distribution appeared to be a relatively smooth process.

## TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

As mentioned in the section on funding, organizations must distribute the funds available to them between their different departments and

activities. It is therefore relevant to look at the core activities of Canadian organizations.




Figure 25. Types of organizational activities.

## OBSERVATIONS

The types of activities carried out by organizations can be divided into five main categories:

1. Interventions in the context of violent radicalization;
2. Collaborative work;
3. Training;
4. Primary prevention activities; and
5. Research.

### Interventions

For the interviewed organizations, interventions remain the main activity and—depending on the sector the organization works in—they can take different forms and be divided into several types. For example, some organizations offer psychosocial and community-based interventions involving clinical interventions, mentoring, or support services provided by community members. Other organizations carry out intervention activities focusing on the people surrounding individuals affected by radicalization, i.e., families, friends and anyone who knows or is concerned about someone who is being radicalized. Finally, law enforcement organizations have interventions involving prosecution and monitoring of individuals suspected of committing or intending to commit crimes related to radicalization or extremism.

Carrying out interventions in a context of radicalization and extremism also involves risk assessment enabling an intervention plan to be drawn up and—if necessary—clients to be referred or the provision of short, medium, or long-term care. Lastly, providing community-level support and crisis intervention following hate or radicalization-related incidents is another type of intervention activity reported in the interview process.

Practitioners are also increasingly being faced with requests from clients to provide their services online. Although most prefer face-to-face interactions, they are nevertheless open to the idea of expanding their service offering. This reflects the evolution of practice towards greater use of technology. However, it also brings

challenges such as uncertainty about clients' identities or intentions, confidentiality issues, and the lack of access to clients' non-verbal clues, which can be a source of helpful information on their emotional states.

### Collaborations

Collaborative activities are central to organizations because they allow programs to function well and interventions to be improved. In most cases, collaborations take place between practitioners, organizations, and between different intervention teams. The teams can discuss the usually clinical cases and—whenever required—refer them to other practitioners, intervention teams, and organizations. Collaborative work is also done for information sharing and, in some cases, funding purposes. A subsequent report will focus exclusively on the issue of collaborative work and discuss it in greater detail.

### Training

The interviewed organizations report conducting training for professionals across a range of sectors. Practitioners receive training for professional development purposes, and some expressed the need for more training that would allow them to improve their practice and bring them in line with the recommendations of the research community.

### Primary Prevention

Several practitioners (n = 14) reported engaging in prevention work. Their organizations offer workshops and awareness-raising activities aimed at a wider audience, with the goal of demystifying the phenomenon of radicalization, promoting values such as living together and educating the public about different cultures and religions. Activities may take the form of educational videos, presentations in schools, and other activities (e.g., the Junior Police Academy program) involving young people. Primary prevention activities are generally designed to provide information.

## Research

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Research is another type of activity frequently mentioned by the interviewed organizations. Research activities aim to advance the state knowledge in the field of prevention of radicalization and violent extremism and inform practice and optimize interventions. Evaluation of programs, organizing and participating in symposia and conferences were also cited as re-

search activities. Practitioners we spoke to felt these activities allowed them to develop training modules, produce highly important documents and deliverables, such as practice guides, program and risk assessment tools, and internal statistics on interventions. Finally, organizations in the law enforcement sector spoke of criminal investigations being a research-type activity they frequently engaged in.

# OVERVIEW OF INTERVENTION PROGRAMS

## ABOUT THE PROGRAMS

The data gathered from the stakeholders' comments on their respective organizations yielded some valuable insights about the specifics of the intervention programs, their objectives, expected outcomes, and the sectors involved.



Figure 26. About the programs.

## OBSERVATIONS

The organizations interviewed in the course of this research were at different stages of their program implementation processes. Indeed, some reported that their programs had already been designed but not yet or not fully implemented. While some organizations were either well established or further along with the implementation process, some were still at the pilot project stage. However, the vast majority of the reported intervention programs were less than four years old. The programs were often set up following a critical local, national, or international event, such as a major terrorist attack, a hate incident or the outbreak of war. They were also developed in response to an increase in radicalization-related issues at the local or national level (e.g., the rise of the extreme right or hate crimes), which served as a justification for the creation of programs and called for the improvement of service provision and expertise in the field.

Other factors spurring the development of programs include the socio-political climate, lack of knowledge or fear of violent radicalization and extremism, and the existence of communities considered vulnerable due to the fact they had been targeted or affected by violent radicalism and/or hate. Moreover, some programs emerged as a result of partnerships between stakeholders who identified deficiencies in specific services and decided to join forces and expertise with the aim of offering these services. Thus, in order to carry out their programs, organizations have to rely on the assistance of various contributors and other stakeholders. Their involvement and their contribution level vary significantly from one organization to another, but collaboration remains vital for the overwhelming majority of the organizations. As already mentioned, further details on the issue of collaborative work will be provided in a forthcoming report.

## PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PHASES

### INTERVENTION PROGRAM DESIGN AND PLANNING

Study the field:

- Identify needs and issues
  - Identify key sectors
  - Identify key experts and stakeholders
- Conduct research, literature reviews, etc.

Build partnerships:

- With stakeholders
- With communities

Apply for/receive funding

Design programs



### PROGRAMS

- 2 programs:
- 1 Alberta
  - 1 British Columbia

### PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

- Operationalize the program and its objectives
- Logistics of the program
- Staff recruitment
- Staff training
- Determine the roles of staff members
- Set up and implement services
- Start taking on the first clients



### PROGRAMS

- 10 programs:
- 6 Ontario
  - 2 Alberta
  - 2 Quebec

### PROGRAM ROLLOUT

- Provide intervention services to clients
- Research activities
- Training activities
- Ensure the smooth running of programs
- Build partnerships
- Reassess and respond to client and program needs
- Adjusting programs along the way
- Seek funding when necessary



### PROGRAMS

- 10 programs:
- 4 Quebec
  - 2 Alberta
  - 2 Ontario
  - 1 New Brunswick
  - 1 British Columbia

### PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION

- Improve services
- Broaden the range of services
- Develop new programs
- Broaden the target client base
- Evaluate the program
- Develop and consolidate partnerships
- Apply for funding



### PROGRAMS

- 2 programs:
- 2 Quebec

### TERMINATION OF FUNDING AND/OR PROGRAM RENEWAL

- Closure or end of the funding period
- and/or
- Renewal of the program
- Continuation of the program (if permanent)



### PROGRAMS

- 1 program:
- 1 Quebec



Figure 27. Program development phases.

## OBSERVATIONS

The About the Programs section highlights the fact that the intervention programs of Canadian organizations are relatively new, with most having been in place for less than four years. The results of the mapping also indicate that at the time of the interviews, Canadian programs were in varying stages of development. The section below illustrates and explains what these different phases are and discusses the trends observed.

### Development Phases of Intervention Programs

At the time of the mapping interviews, the organizations' intervention programs were in one of the following five phases of development:

1. Program design and planning;
2. Program implementation;
3. Program rollout;
4. Program development and expansion; and
5. Termination of funding and/or program renewal.

### Program Design and Planning

Generally, it is during this first phase that organizations apply for or receive funding to support the development of their intervention programs. It is also during this phase that organizations begin to design their programs and plan the activities and services to be offered to clients. This stage requires a great deal of research on the part of the organizations and involves determining the needs and issues that affect their region and target clientele, the key sectors with which to partner, and the experts and stakeholders likely to contribute to their project. The design and planning phase also involves getting acquainted with the scientific literature specific to the issue of violent radicalization so that the intervention program is based on best practices identified by the research community. At the time of the mapping interviews, two organizations reported that the development of their intervention program was at the design and planning stage. As a result, these organizations were not yet in a position to take on clients. This is in line with the

quantitative results regarding the number of intakes reported by the organizations. In addition, organizations at the program design and planning stage were actively seeking to partner with other organizations with more experience in the field in order to benefit from their expertise and to be supported in their development.

### Program Implementation

During the program implementation phase, organizations are making their programs and objectives operational, i.e., they turn them into concrete actions. It is also during this phase that the logistical aspects, including finding premises or obtaining the tools and materials necessary to carry out activities, are dealt with. Also, the staff to be involved in interventions are often recruited and trained at this stage.

Due to the often high demand for care services, some organizations are obliged to start receiving clients at this stage of their development, even though their programs are not yet fully operational. However, this situation mainly concerns organizations in the psychosocial sector where the staff is primarily made up of mental health and social services professionals who already possess the necessary skills to care for clients, even if they are not fully trained on the specifics of intervention in a violent radicalization context or well informed on the issue. Despite the professional experience and expertise practitioners tend to have, many report that having to intervene in a violent radicalization context without in-depth knowledge of the subject is anxiety-provoking. It is common for practitioners to feel helpless even if they do not hesitate to offer their services when the situation requires it. They take the time to analyze their interventions with their teams to highlight the strengths and areas to improve upon for future interventions. To some extent, it is this practice that allows organizations that receive clients early on to refine their interventions while still being at the program implementation stage themselves. Organizations are thus able to utilize the findings from the field and make changes in an iterative way. At the time of the mapping interviews, the programs of ten organizations—located mainly in the Ontario area—were at the implementation stage.

### Program Rollout

By the rollout phase, the organizations had already completed the initial implementation process of their programs and started to offer regular services to clients. In addition, activities such as research and training were also being carried out. However, organizations in the rollout phase seemed to invest almost all of the resources in their intervention programs. They were also trying to build partnerships and raise funds to help support their intervention-related activities. The experience gained in this phase was used to reassess the clients' and practitioners' needs and adjust accordingly. Of the interviewed organizations, a total of 11—primarily in Quebec—were in the program rollout phase. This may be explained by the fact that the programs of these organizations had been in place for longer and had, therefore, ample time to complete their initial implementation process.

### Program Development and Expansion

In the development and expansion phase, programs already have a fairly solid foundation, which allows organizations to focus on improving their intervention services and expanding their service offering. It is also during this phase that organizations develop new programs enabling them to serve a broader range of clients and establish new partnerships with collaborators that will help them achieve their new goals. It is also often at this stage that organizations think about having their intervention programs evaluated. At the time of the mapping interviews, two Quebec programs were at this stage of development.

### Termination of Funding and/or Program Renewal

Termination of funding and/or program renewal is the last phase of program development. It often marks the end of an organization's mandate and, therefore, of its intervention activities. It is at this stage that organizations wishing to continue their intervention activities may attempt to renew their funding or—in case of those whose program is permanent—take steps to ensure the program's continuity. Only one Quebec organization had a program at this stage of its development. This is not surprising, considering that most Canadian organizations are very recent and, as a consequence, still in the early stages of their development. This means that, at the time of the interviews, their funding period had not yet ended.

Overall, the results indicate that the intervention programs of Canadian organizations are very young and, therefore, in the initial implementation or rollout stages. The results also point to the fact that programs in Quebec are at the most advanced stages of development. Indeed, only Quebec programs were in the development and expansion and termination of funding and/or program renewal stages of development.

## PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

Many links can be made between the types of activities organizations offer and the objectives of their intervention programs. Indeed, as the organization's activities have been designed to meet the intervention objectives, there are

many similarities in both the types of activities and the program objectives. This demonstrates a degree of consistency in the organizations' planning.




Figure 28. Program objectives.

## OBSERVATIONS

The first objective of the programs is to intervene in a context of violent radicalization. Indeed, in the course of this research, it is the objective most often stressed by the practitioners. Given that they work in secondary and tertiary prevention, it appears to be rather intuitive and aligned with the organizations' missions. Other more specific objectives linked to intervention include prevention and risk reduction, with a particular emphasis on reducing risk factors and increasing protective factors for the individual. However, the specifics of the programs are often unclear, making the task of turning the rather broad objectives into more focused, concrete, and possibly more measurable sub-objectives increasingly difficult.

The second objective is to conduct research projects to advance knowledge about violent radicalization and the peculiarities of intervention in this field, which, according to stakeholders, remains poorly documented from an empirical point of view. The research objectives are primarily concerned with improving assessment methods, generating quantitative data for sta-

tistical analysis, and transferring knowledge from research to practice.

Training was another objective that emerged from the interviews. Organizations were keen to receive, develop, and/or offer training, and felt that it would allow them to enhance the skills of their staff and share the acquired expertise with external partners. Through training, organizations can empower practitioners to better deal with the phenomenon of violent radicalization.

Finally, primary prevention was another objective mentioned by the interviewed organizations. Many expressed a desire to become an established resource in their community, build lasting partnerships, and maintain an active presence and dialogue. Some organizations talked about primary prevention as a means of targeting resilience and hate speech. For others, this was a more secondary goal and they did not discuss it in detail.

## SECTORS INVOLVED

Various sectors are involved in intervention programs. These are described in the following section.



Figure 29. Sectors involved.

## OBSERVATIONS

One element all organizations agree on is the importance of multisectoral collaboration in interventions involving violent radicalization and extremism. All organizations stress that this is an issue that affects different spheres of society and the individual and that, therefore, a wide variety of sectors should be involved in interventions addressing it, depending on the needs identified in each case. The organizations that reported the most significant number of sectors involved were the hubs and situational tables. Indeed, due to their multisectoral nature, their configuration is conducive to intersectoral collaboration. However, the mapping interviews identified some sectors common to most organizations. These comprise the following:

1. The psychosocial sector, including psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers;
2. The community sector, including community members offering non-professional support services to people at risk and their families, non-profit organizations (NGOs), organizations specializing in various issues such as homelessness, addiction, housing, job searching, and so on;
3. The religious sector, offering support and assistance to practitioners when cases of violent radicalization have a significant religious component;
4. The education sector;
5. The law enforcement and justice sector, which primarily intervenes in cases where imminent danger is identified or with individuals whose case is pending in the justice system, and;
6. The research sector providing practitioners with evidence.

Other sectors were also identified but remain more marginal. These include the arts, politics, physical health, communication and media, ethnocultural communities, and the administrative sector.

These results show the importance of multi-sectoral work, which comes naturally to organizations when these services are available and opportunities arise. Indeed, not all organizations are able to involve other sectors, either for financial reasons—when potential partners require a form of payment in return—or because they feel isolated in the area in which they operate and are, therefore, unaware of or unable to access services available in their region. The different sectors' roles are very diverse and vary from intervention to primary prevention. Some sectors, for example, are mainly involved in assisting in the administration and management of organizations. Furthermore, the interviews identified difficulties associated with collaboration between specific sectors—particularly the police, community, and psychosocial sectors—complicating multisectoral partnerships. Working with the media and communication sector can also pose challenges. One organization reported that the media betrayed their trust and published material that ended up undermining their intervention. Issues related to cross-sectoral collaborations between Canadian organizations will be explored further in a report focusing on the subject.

## ANTICIPATED PROGRAM OUTCOMES

In designing and implementing their intervention programs, organizations have expectations about the outcomes they hope to see among both their clients—or program participants—and their practitioners.




Figure 30. Anticipated program outcomes.

## OBSERVATIONS

The anticipated outcomes of the programs can be divided into two categories:

1. Anticipated outcomes for clients/participants, and;
2. Anticipated outcomes for practitioners.

### Anticipated Outcomes for Clients/Participants

The organizations' ultimate objective was to reduce the level of risk of violent radicalization among their clients, ideally in the long term. Some organizations also expect to prevent the departure of foreign fighters to join terrorist groups. They also aim to ensure that their clients are well reintegrated into the community, supported and accompanied throughout the process. Some organizations anticipated more specific outcomes. For example, they hoped to see their clients develop greater self-confidence, a more positive relationship with others, and greater independence. They also wanted them to preserve their religious identity. In short, the organizations expect that as a result of their support and guidance, their clients will be able to integrate or reintegrate into the community and become its full members while maintaining their identity and diversity of opinion.

### Anticipated Outcomes for Practitioners

In terms of expected results for practitioners, organizations expect them to develop or refine their expertise on the subject of violent radicalization. Indeed, they point out that many of their professionals are not specialized in this field and thus need to broaden their knowledge so as to demystify the phenomenon. The interviewed organizations felt that a better understanding of the issue could help alleviate anxiety and make practitioners more comfortable when having to intervene in a violent radicalization context. Those who already have experience working in this context expressed the need to be kept up to date on the developments in the field to base their practices on evidence. This highlights the importance of building bridges with the research community. Moreover, organizations expect their staff to become a resource for interventions and share their expertise. Finally, the interviewed entities expressed a desire to develop training modules and a referral system that would bring together professionals in the field, thereby promoting mutual aid and ultimately improving the quality of interventions.

## NEXT STEPS

Finally, the organizations we met in the course of this research all reported having initiatives they wished to undertake in the future. Most of them were projects they planned to carry out during their mandate but were unable to due to lack of funds, resources, or time. These next

steps were often a logical progression allowing organizations to develop further, improve the quality of their services, and increase their visibility in the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism community.



Figure 31. Next Steps.

## OBSERVATIONS

The next steps for the interviewed organizations fall into five areas:

1. The organizations are keen to develop and consolidate partnerships with different sectors, such as education;
2. They want to broaden their audience and reach by doing primary prevention in addition to their intervention activities to maximize their impact. In particular, they wish to educate the population by drawing up a global portrait of the phenomenon of violent radicalization and demystifying the problem;
3. The organizations hope to be in closer contact with other initiatives in the field to exchange experiences, discuss cases, and share the acquired knowledge in terms of intervention and risk assessment;
4. Another essential step is to develop intervention frameworks that will enable practitioners to feel less helpless when intervening in a violent radicalization context; and
5. Finally, the organizations want to obtain funding that will allow them to continue developing their programs and offer services. Securing funding is an essential condition for the continuation of the organizations' activities.

# Discussion

Any coherent and effective preventive action in the field of violent radicalization—be it governmental or social—must be based not only on a sound understanding of the needs on the ground but also on the means available to meet them. This pan-Canadian mapping made it possible to identify existing practices and the needs of both those working in the field and the populations they serve and to make recommendations in order to better direct investments and preventive efforts in this field.

First and foremost, it is important to note that the field is still in its infancy in Canada. Indeed, most organizations are very young (about four years old) and unevenly distributed across the country. Moreover, practitioners often work in silos, in small local networks often lacking adequate training in violent radicalization prevention. This is not surprising given the relatively recent nature of the shift towards prevention in Canada. A large proportion of the programs have been created in the last four years, and only about ten of them had reached the rollout

phase at the time of the interviews. That said, the absence of programs in several provinces and territories—particularly the Maritimes and central Canada—is a concern considering that active right-wing extremist groups have been identified in all areas, including Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (Perry & Scrivens, 2015). Despite this, no secondary or tertiary prevention programs in the context of violent radicalization could be identified in these provinces through this mapping. This is because the majority of programs were developed in a reactive rather than preventive manner, i.e., they were put in place following a critical event, such as a terrorist attack or an increase in hate incidents or crimes. While it seems logical that the most significant number of Canadian programs are concentrated in the provinces most affected by the phenomenon, namely Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta (see Table 3), it is vital that a preventive and proactive approach is adopted across the country.

**Table 3** Number of Incidents of Violent Extremism Between 2000 and 2018 in Canada

Province	Number of incidents
Alberta	12
British Columbia	13
New Brunswick	1
Ontario	20
Quebec	12

Source: (START, 2019)

In addition to inequalities between provinces, there are also inequalities within provinces reflected at the level of the regions served by secondary and tertiary prevention programs. The majority of organizations are concentrated in large cities and are municipal or regional in scope. Regional organizations must frequently move to other parts of the province or even intervene at the national level due to a lack of resources or a high-risk situation requiring their expertise. Difficulties arise from the fact that these organizations were not originally designed to be mobile or to provide services on such a large scale. The unforeseen moves and interventions have budgetary and human resource consequences, which can have an impact on interventions in the cities where they are located—particularly in terms of continuity of services—and lead to work overload for staff. In order to make up for the lack of resources in other geographical areas, some teams have regionalized by creating satellite teams in other parts of their province. In a bid to overcome silo work and to maintain communication with the central team, these regionalized teams have set up online case discussion systems to strengthen knowledge sharing and the skills of local teams.

Intervention in the field of prevention of violent extremism is in itself a new challenge for many practitioners who find themselves having to work in an ever-changing and complex field. The interviews revealed that many do not feel adequately equipped or trained in the field and report feeling anxious when having to intervene in these types of cases. However, Canadian practitioners are no exception as a similar situation has been observed internationally, as noted by Madriaza et al. (2017). The shortfall in knowledge, experience, or expertise in the field was also reflected at the organizational and programming levels. For example, there was a general lack of explicit and specific theories of change and guidelines in the different teams interviewed.

**Intervention in the field of prevention of violent extremism is in itself a new challenge for many practitioners who find themselves having to work in an ever-changing and complex field.**

Of note is the implication of research in intervention. Indeed, the field of prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in Canada is characterized by the very active role played by researchers. The demand for evidence-based knowledge and the nascent nature of intervention programs may be the reason why a significant portion of intervention teams works with research teams involved in tasks that sometimes go beyond research. For example, it was found that in some cases, intervention programs were designed and run by researchers rather than practitioners. In other cases, researchers supported the intervention team by providing training or knowledge in the field. Many also worked in tandem by producing research reports or undertaking program evaluation projects. Despite this close collaboration, none of the identified programs have been evaluated, but three had begun the process or were planning to do so.

Multi-sectoral and inter-team collaborations are probably the most important aspect of work in the field and are at the root of some organizations' intervention models. They are, for example, at the very heart of the hubs or situational tables, which

are based on cross-sectoral collaborations with organizations working outside violent radicalization, but whose resources are considered necessary due to the complexity of the phenomenon. Moreover, multi-sectoral collaborations are frequently cited by practitioners as a preferred means of improving practices.

While multi-sectoral and inter-team approaches are widely desired, they appear to be a particular challenge in the field of violent radicalization and violent extremism intervention. Specifically, competition between organizations caused by limited funding and the existence of different—and sometimes contradictory—practices in risk assessment, case management, and information sharing can make collaborations difficult to establish. The existence of different practices is especially evident within the psychosocial and the law enforcement sector.

The issue of competition is heightened in organizations that serve the same territory and depend on few and undiversified funding sources. Some practitioners also feel that researchers receive a large share of available funding at the expense of practice settings. Others believe that funding is mainly concentrated around a few organizations, leaving little or no room for the emergence or continuity of new initiatives. This competition can be explained by the fragility of this still-emerging field and the lack of clear guidelines or public policies in the field. In effect, there are widely varying standards of practice, training, and expertise, contributing to the doubts that some practitioners have about each other's competence. Despite the competitive atmosphere, most organizations share a common interpretative framework characterized by non-violence, coexistence, and inclusivity. Moreover, when there is less financial pressure and no territory sharing, collaborations are easier to establish.

In Canada, the major issues related to collaboration concern two approaches that are at times seen as conflicting: the security and the psychosocial approach. More specifically, in the context of this mapping, it was workers in the mental health and the psychosocial sectors that perceived these approaches as being in conflict. This perception was reproduced at the organizational level, where the missions and

mandates of organizations from these two sectors were viewed as opposed. This concerned, in particular, issues around information sharing—something which poses a significant barrier to collaboration between the two sectors. On one side, law enforcement has specific guidelines around information sharing to prevent information leaks that could threaten their investigations. On the other, mental health and psychosocial workers follow strict confidentiality and privacy rules and are, therefore, reluctant to share information for fear of it being used by police services or because they are concerned it may lead to the stigmatization of certain individuals and communities. Only the situational tables and one other interviewed organization did not mention having

difficulties with the information sharing between the psychosocial and security sectors. This exception could be explained by the pre-existing relationship of trust, positive experiences the two sectors had, and the fact that they had set and followed clear guidelines for information sharing. These specific challenges of collaboration in the area of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism reflect the delicate balance between the importance of ensuring public safety and national security and the importance of maintaining trust between communities and psychosocial practitioners.

**While multi-sectoral and inter-team approaches are widely desired, they appear to be a particular challenge in the field of violent radicalization and violent extremism intervention.**

The background consists of large, overlapping geometric shapes in a teal color against a white background. The shapes are triangles and quadrilaterals that create a dynamic, abstract pattern.

# **Key Results and Recommendations**

# Key Results and Recommendations

## 1

### Key Result

The mapping exercise revealed that Canadian organizations are very diverse in terms of 1) founding values and orientations; 2) size and organizational structure; 3) team structure; 4) practice areas; and 5) mandates and types of activities. This diversity contributes significantly to a multi-sectoral approach to violent radicalization.

### Recommendation

Continue to support and promote the plurality of values, structures and sectors, and the multidisciplinary of the teams.

## 2

### Key Result

There appears to be an inconsistency between the size and capacity of organizations/teams and the number of actual cases taken.

### Recommendation

Ensure consistency between the size and capacity of an organization/team and the needs on the ground. Given that field realities vary, strengthening collaborations between organizations and their community partners could allow for a better allocation of resources and thus enhance the ability to adequately respond to multiple and diverse needs.

## 3

### Key Result

Secondary and tertiary prevention programs are very new to Canada.

### Recommendation

Provide continued funding for potentially effective programs in order to ensure proper implementation and to avoid failures due to lack of resources.

## 4

### Key Result

Programs differ in terms of age and stage of development.

### Recommendation

Promote exchanges between practitioners from different organizations and teams to maximize knowledge sharing, improve practices, and avoid repeating the same mistakes in different places.

# Key Results and Recommendations

## 5

### Key Result

Program development in Canada appears to be reactive rather than proactive.

### Recommendations

A) Promote exchanges between practitioners and the communities they work with to develop a better understanding of their needs.

B) Support program officers to develop a strategic plan and medium-term vision and objectives.

## 6

### Key Result

Organizations appear to base their actions on an implicit rather than an explicit framework, logic model, or theory of change. The majority of organizations are based on a holistic reintegration model rather than a deradicalization model, and their goals focus on reducing the potential for violence and the risk of acting out. That said, the specific objectives set to achieve this goal are often very vague.

### Recommendation

Organizations should develop explicit theories of change that are aligned with their founding values and missions. Such theories would help clarify objectives and ensure that these objectives are measurable.

## 7

### Key Result

The majority of organizations focus on reintegration and reducing the potential for violence and the risk of acting out rather than on deradicalization. However, the case management models and specific objectives set to achieve these goals are often diffuse.

### Recommendation

Organizations should improve their case management models and specify their objectives in order to better structure their actions. This would allow them to evaluate their successes, failures and needs, more effectively.

# Key Results and Recommendations

## 8

### Key Result

In order to survive, many programs develop collaborations and partnerships, but these greatly vary in scope and the specific challenges they face (i.e., competition, lack of trust, isolation, lack of resources, etc.).

### Recommendation

Foster trust and collaboration by facilitating ongoing interactions between organizations/teams through, for example, communities of practice.

## 9

### Key Result

Organizations report that their staff do not always have the knowledge and/or skills required by the field.

### Recommendation

Provide accessible and ongoing training so that practitioners are aware of developments in best practices and research. Encourage exchanges between practitioners from different organizations and teams.

## 10

### Key Result

Tensions arising from conflicting organizational values—particularly around consent, confidentiality, and information sharing—make collaboration between the law enforcement and psychosocial sectors difficult.

### Recommendation

Establish communities of practice or “tabletop” type meetings between the police and security sectors and the psychosocial and community sectors. This will allow for the development of consensus-based solutions to important challenges in the field (e.g., understanding each sector’s culture and national and provincial legal frameworks, framing consent, confidentiality, and information sharing issues).

## 11

### Key Result

Community policing is viewed with less suspicion by the psychosocial and community sectors than other policing sectors.

### Recommendation

Promote the existence and involvement of community policing in communities of practice and in building collaborative relationships with organizations.

# Key Results and Recommendations

## 12

### Key Result

Collaboration with the media and communications sector is sometimes difficult due to instances of breaches of trust or prior agreements.

### Recommendations

Foster a continuous dialogue with the media community to raise their awareness of the delicate balance between the dissemination of information and their moral and safety responsibilities to individuals and communities.

Involve the web and social media companies with grassroots organizations in order to make them face up to their responsibility for the spread of hate and violent radicalization or extremism and, consequently, their ability to prevent it

Hold the media and web and social networking companies responsible and accountable for their actions when they break pre-established agreements with organizations/teams.

## 13

### Key Result

The sources of funding are not very diversified and primarily ministerial, which creates a dependency and weakens the sustainability of the organizations. It is also important to note that this situation generates a climate of competition between organizations, which is not conducive to collaboration. In addition, some initiatives simply cannot find the financial support they need to carry out their activities.

### Recommendation

Diversify funding sources, particularly for newer, smaller initiatives that are under-funded and rely heavily on volunteers to operate.

## 14

### Key Result

There is a perception that most funding is directed to the research sector at the expense of the community-based organizations and practice sectors.

### Recommendations

Review budget allocations for research and on-the-ground initiatives to improve equity and balance of funding.

Encourage collaborations between the research and practice communities—make research work for practice.

# Key Results and Recommendations

## 15

### Key Result

The lack of resources in some areas has resulted in organizations moving beyond their usual territory and even beyond their practice area. This fluidity has its advantages, but it does not solve the glaring lack of resources in certain regions of the country.

### Recommendation

Adopt a decentralized approach by developing resources in various settings and promoting collaboration between these different resources.

## 16

### Key Result

At the time of the interviews, there were no organizations identified in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, the Maritime Provinces, and the Territories, other than within the law enforcement and the justice system.

### Recommendation

Assess the needs in provinces and territories where no resources have been identified and develop initiatives or optimize existing structures (e.g., give them a new mandate, provide training, etc.) so that they can provide services where needed.

## 17

### Key Result

The teams wish to offer a wider variety of services, reach a more diversified client base and cover a larger territory. They also want to put in place actions allowing them to evaluate the impact of their services. Finally, organizations want to develop guidelines and intervention frameworks for risk assessment and management.

### Recommendation

Foster ongoing dialogue within communities of practice to share knowledge, tools, and experiences around the issue of risk assessment and management. Such dialogue will also allow for the co-development of consensus-based frameworks and guidelines, given that the current state of the literature does not allow for the generation of evidence-based recommendations on this topic.

# Limitations

The main limitation of this mapping is that it is impossible to ensure all organizations and individuals working in the field of prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada have been identified. As with any mapping based on a snowballing methodology, the number of identified organizations depended largely on the knowledge of the individuals contacted and information on the Internet. In addition, because in Canada, the field of radicalization and extremism prevention is still in its infancy, the contacted organizations had limited knowledge of the organizational environment related to this issue. This is due in part to the fact that many of the organizations were recently created or came from other areas of expertise. We attempted to overcome this limitation by ensuring that we contacted local practitioners in each province and territory and by maintaining constant communication with the Canadian Centre for Community Engagement and Violence Prevention, which has funded many of the initiatives. However, it is possible that prevention programs have been implemented in areas other than those identified in the map-

ping. For example, no programs were identified within the correctional services or education system. This does not necessarily mean that there have been no secondary or tertiary prevention initiatives for violent radicalization within these sectors. Indeed, it is possible that these programs could not be identified because they were either temporary or because of the limitations of our knowledge and that of our partners.

Moreover, it is important to note that this mapping focuses on secondary and tertiary prevention programs and that a mapping of primary prevention initiatives and programs will be conducted in 2021. Finally, it should be emphasized that mapping is akin to taking a picture at a specific moment in time and space. As prevention of violent extremism is a constantly evolving field, continuous efforts are made to keep up to date with changes in initiatives, teams, or programs. A summary snapshot is available through the CPN-PREV interactive map, which is available at:

<https://cpnprev.ca/fr/lacarte-interactive/>.

# Conclusion

This study is a first attempt to identify programs working in the areas of secondary and tertiary prevention of violent radicalization and extremism in Canada. Until now, there has been no directory or profile description of Canadian organizations working in this field. This report was devoted to describing these organizations and will be followed by a report looking at collaboration issues and another one examining intervention models and issues.

**The following points summarize the results of the report:**

**1** The field of violent radicalization and extremism prevention is still in its infancy in Canada; prevention programs are very young and, in many cases, not specialized or trained in the field.

**2** Organizations involved in secondary and tertiary prevention in the context of violent radicalization are unevenly distributed across the country and mostly concentrated in the major cities of Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta. Many areas of the country remain without specialized resources on the issue and put pressure on existing resources.

**3** Canadian practitioners do not feel adequately equipped to work with individuals at risk and/or in the process of violent radicalization and feel anxious when called upon to intervene in this context.

**4** Researchers play multiple roles in intervention programs. These roles sometimes go beyond research. Indeed, some researchers were involved in client interventions or in the design of intervention programs. This may be due to a lack of practitioners and resources or confusion about the skills needed to deliver interventions in the field.

**5** Multi-sectoral and inter-team collaborations are encouraged but are also complicated by competition for funding and differences in approaches to intervention and information sharing, particularly between the psychosocial and law enforcement sectors.

# Coming up

**Report II:  
Collaborative models and related issues**

**Report III:  
Intervention models and related issues**

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